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Abstract
Previous research has been conducted that suggests that those who have trait anxiety have
lower working memory capacity. Lower working memory capacity has also been shown to
increase the likelihood that one commits cognitive heuristics. In the current research, we
examined the relationship between one’s level of trait anxiety and their chances of committing
the fundamental attribution error (FAE). In the experiment participants were randomly selected
into one of four different conditions. Then participants completed the Spielberger trait anxiety
scale which was used to separate participants into low and high trait anxiety groups. In each
condition participants read an essay about a course policy change and answered questions about
the essay and the author to test whether or not they committed the FAE. The essay was either
pro- or anti-policy change and was either written under a choice condition or an assigned
condition. Results showed that trait anxiety had no effect on one’s likelihood of committing the
FAE. The only significant main effect was that of essay position which is consistent with
previous research. Future directions for research are discussed to explore this concept further.
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The Effect of Trait Anxiety on the Fundamental Attribution Error
Throughout their lives people make many errors in judgment and make irrational
decisions. People can sometimes unknowingly commit obvious judgmental errors on relatively
simple tasks. One error that is very prevalent among the general population is the fundamental
attribution error. The fundamental attribution error is the tendency for people to underestimate
the impact of situational forces and overestimate the role of dispositional factors when making
judgments (Forgas, 1998). That is, people tend to overestimate the internal factors and
underestimate the external factors when explaining the behavior of other people. If a person was
walking along a path in the woods and tripped someone committing the FAE would likely
believe that that person is clumsy instead thinking that there may have been a root or rock that
caused the person to trip. The FAE is what is known as a cognitive heuristic which is a
simplifying process used to reduce cognitive effort (O’Sullivan, 2003). Heuristics can replace
complex mental algorithms which can lead to reasonable judgments but they can also lead to
severe irrational errors in judgment (Tversky & Khaneman, 1974). Different variations of the
FAE have been studied under different names such as the correspondence bias or the over-
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attribution bias (O’Sullivan, 2003). The theory of FAE all began with the well renowned study
conducted by Jones and Harris in 1967 on the attribution of attitudes (Jones & Harris, 1967).
The study by Jones and Harris (1967) is the best known experiment that demonstrates the
FAE even though they studied it under the name of the correspondence inference theory. In the
experiment subjects were given one of several short essays written about Castro’s dictatorship in
Cuba. The essay was written with either a pro-Castro stance or an anti-Castro stance. The
subjects were then either told that the person who wrote the essay had the freedom of choice to
pick which side to defend or that the author was assigned which position to defend. The subjects
then answered a series of questions about the personal qualities of the author and the subject’s
attitude about the topic. The most important question was what the study subject believed was
the authors true attitude toward Castro. Results showed that the direction of the essay was the
greatest factor in what people thought the authors true opinion was. This is to be expected in the
choice conditions but the results in the no choice conditions were also highly significant. There
was greatest variance in the no choice-pro condition which makes sense as that is the condition
where the person is being told to argue against the popular belief. However, subject’s still rated
the author’s true opinions as being pro-Castro. The main result of the experiment was that there
was a tendency to attribute correspondence between the behavior of writing a pro-Castro essay
and the private attitude of the author even when the author was assigned to write that way. This
is the basis of the FAE as the subjects unreasonably attributed attitudes, either pro or anti-Castro,
to the author even in the no choice conditions.
Prior research has been done on what affects the probability that someone will commit
the FAE. One such study was that conducted by Forgas (1998) who examined whether
someone’s mood would affect the chances that they would commit the FAE. In this experiment
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subjects first took a test of their verbal abilities. They then received positive, neutral, or negative
feedback about their abilities which induced a corresponding happy, neutral, or negative mood in
the participants. They then were asked to read essays on a familiar issue written by a student
participating in a debate and were either told that the student chose to represent the position or
was assigned the position. Participants were then asked to give their opinions on the writer by
answering several 7-point bipolar questions. Results showed that those who were in the good
mood condition were more likely to commit the FAE than were those in the bad mood condition.
These results provide evidence that mood could be associated with someone’s likelihood that
they commit or do not commit the FAE.
Mood is not the only factor that has been tested on the likelihood that someone will
commit the FAE. Horhota and Blanchard-Fields (2006) tested how beliefs and attributional
complexity influenced someone’s correspondence bias. In this study participants were asked
their opinions about the author of an essay that was written on a topic of interest. They were told
that the author either chose to write on the topic or was assigned to write about that topic. The
results showed that older adults tended to have a more extreme attitude attribution rating than
young adults. This shows that older people may be more likely to commit the FAE error than
younger people.
Accountability is another factor that has been tested to see if it has an influence on the
likelihood that someone will commit the FAE. Tetlock (2006) tested how one’s level of
accountability for their answers impacted their likelihood to commit the FAE. This experiment
was set up in a similar manner to other experiments testing the FAE. Subjects were presented
with either a pro- or anti-affirmative-action essay that was written under high- or low-choice
conditions. The subjects were also asked to answer questions about the writer of the essay.
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Study subjects were then led to believe that they would either be held accountable for their
impressions of the writer or not. In the accountability condition subjects learned of being
accountable for their opinions either before or after exposure to the essay. Results showed that
accountability was a significant moderator of the over attribution effect. Subjects who did not
feel accountable for their judgments were significantly more likely to have strong inferences
about the attitudes of low-choice essay writers.
A fourth study was conducted testing how social influence as a stimulus control
influenced people’s likelihood to commit the FAE. There were five different vignettes that
subjects read where three were treatment vignettes and two were controls. In the treatment
vignettes there were two conditions in which the actor in the story was either alone or in the
presence of others, which served as the social influence. Subjects were then asked to attribute
any percentage they chose to situational, dispositional, or purpose factors to explain the actions
of the actor in the vignette. The results of this study showed that the presence of others in the
vignette led to an increase in subjects committing the FAE.
As shown there has been plenty of research on variables which affects the likelihood that
a person may commit the FAE. An area which has not been explored yet is the effect that
anxiety may have on one’s chances of committing the FAE. Spielberger (1983) defined anxiety
as, “the subjective feeling of tension, apprehension, nervousness, and worry associated with an
arousal of the autonomic nervous system” (p. 1). Spielberger (1972, 1983) also made a
distinction between two different types of anxiety; trait or state anxiety. Trait anxiety is used to
describe a relatively stable personality variable whereas state anxiety is used to describe a
transient emotional state where the feelings of anxiety can change based on the situation.
Measures of anxiety are usually measured using the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger,
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Gorusch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). Anxiety seems to be an important factor to consider
because research has shown that use of cognitive heuristics is a result of limited resources in
working memory and research has show that anxiety reduces the limited resources of working
memory.
For the purposes of this study the most important effect of stress and anxiety has to do
with their impact on the working memory component of the brain. Baddeley’s model is the most
well known and established theoretical conceptualization of working memory (Baddeley, 1986,
2000, 2003). According to Baddeley’s model working memory is where information is actively
manipulated, processed, and temporarily stored. Information in working memory can be
rehearsed and then encoded in long-term memory or it will decay and be forgotten. Working
memory is also restricted by a limited capacity (Baddeley, 1986). Working memory capacity is
usually defined as the amount of information that can be processed and temporarily stored for a
limited amount of time (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980). Baddeley also broke working memory
down into four components. The main component is the central executive and then there are
three “slave” systems known as the phonological loop, the visuospatial sketchpad, and the
episodic buffer (Baddeley, 2000). The most important component is the central executive which
is responsible for processing the information temporarily held in working memory. Prior
research has been conducted on how reduced working memory leads to an increase in the use of
cognitive heuristics.
A study conducted by Verschueren, Shaeken, and D’Ydewalle (2005) was done to test
how working memory differences led to different methods for answering conditional reasoning
questions. They tested two different methods for answering conditional reasoning questions.
The mental models account was when the person forms a mental representation of the content of
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all relevant situations and draws a conclusion that is congruent with these models. This method
is believed to use a majority of the working memory resources. The other method is less
strenuous on working memory and this method is known as the probabilistic heuristic. In this
method people solve conditional inferences by taking into account the likelihood of the
conclusion given the categorical premise of the problem. In this study participants were
separated into low, medium, and high working memory capacity groups using the operation span
test (La Pointe & Engle, 1990; Turner & Engle, 1989). The participants were then asked a series
of inference problems and were asked to state their reasoning out loud. The results of the study
showed that those higher in working memory were more likely to use the mental models method
than those with lower working memory. Those with lower working memory relied more on the
probabilistic heuristic to solve the inference problems. This study supports the idea that those
with lower working memory resources or limited working memory resources are more likely to
use heuristic reasoning processes. This is essential to this study as anxiety has been shown to
reduce working memory capacity.
There are two leading theories with supportive evidence about the effects of anxiety on
cognitive performance. One of the theories is known as the processing efficiency theory
developed by Eysenck and Calvo in 1992. Processing efficiency theory distinguishes between
cognitive effectiveness and cognitive efficiency. Effectiveness is related to the quality of
performance on a certain task. Efficiency is the relationship between effectiveness and the
processing invested in the performance. Thus, high processing efficiency is when there is a high
level of performance while using relatively minimal cognitive resources. Anxiety has a role to
play in the processing efficiency theory (Eysneck & Calvo, 1992), as anxiety has an effect on the
central executive component of working memory. The cause for anxiety’s effect on the central

Trait Anxiety and the FAE 9
executive is believed to be that anxiety produces worry which then uses up some of the
processing resources of working memory and thereby reduces processing efficiency (Baddeley,
1986, 2002). The task irrelevant thoughts that are produced as a result of anxiety are believed to
affect performance by reducing the limited amount of attentional resources in working memory
available to be allocated to the main ongoing task.
The second theory about the affects of anxiety on cognitive performance is the attentional
control theory (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). Attentional control theory is based
on the premises of processing efficiency theory. Eysenck et al. (2007) cited several reasons for
the need to expand upon the premise of the processing efficiency theory and thus devised the
attentional control theory. One of their reasons was that the processing efficiency theory failed
to specify which functions of the central executive were affected most by anxiety. A second was
that there were no assumptions about the effects of distracting stimuli on anxious individuals.
The third was that the theory focused only on cognitive tasks involving neutral and nonemotional
stimuli. The fourth cited reason was that the processing efficiency theory does not consider
cases in which high anxious individuals may outperform non-anxious individuals. It is theorized
that the central executive is responsible for attention and is involved with managing the
allocation and focus of attentional systems (Conwan, 2001). As the name implies a core
assumption of attentional control theory is that anxiety has an effect on attention. The theory
states that anxiety impairs attentional control which is a function of the central executive
component of working memory. If this is the case anxious individuals are more likely to allocate
attentional resources to threat-related stimuli. These stimuli can either be internal, such as
worrisome thoughts, or they can be external, such as threatening task-irrelevant stimuli.
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Attentional control theory also relates to an attentional system theory developed by
Corbetta and Shulman (2002). According to their theory there are two attentional systems.
There is the goal-directed attentional system, which is influenced by knowledge and current
goals, and there is the stimulus-driven attentional system, which is influenced by salient stimuli.
The goal-directed system is referred to as top-down processing whereas the stimulus-driven
system is referred to as bottom-up processing. According to the attentional control theory
proposed by Eysenck et al. (2007) anxiety interrupts the balance between the two different
systems. Theoretically, anxiety increases the influence of bottom-up processing and decreases
the influence of top-down processing. Anxiety decreases performance by decreasing the goaldriven attentional control system, especially the ability for the central executive to inhibit
information, shift attention, and update information in working memory. This causes a person to
rely more on stimulus-driven attention (Eysenck, et al., 2007). Tests have shown that anxiety
has been associated with adverse effects on cognitive performance, especially when these tasks
require attentional control (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009). Studies have shown that the ability to
control attention and remain focused is a large determinant of performance on working memory
tasks (Engle, 2002; Kane, Bleckley, Conway & Engle, 2001).
As previously stated worry is associated with the onset of anxiety within an individual.
Worry is associated with uncontrollable thoughts about possible future negative events (Hayes,
Hirsch, & Matthews, 2008). The difference between a high worrier and a low worrier is the
uncontrollability of negative thoughts once worry begins (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, &
DePee, 1983). Research has shown that there are performance deficits on target tasks under
high-memory load conditions for all participants but the deficits are greater in those with highanxiety than those with low-anxiety. Eysenck and Calvo (1992) believe that the deficits are a
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result of worrisome thought which deplete working memory capacity by reducing the amount of
resources available to complete the target task.
A study by Hayes, Hirsch, & Matthews (2008) tested the effect of worry versus
nonworrisome thinking on working memory capacity in high and low worriers. In the study
participants filled out the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, &
Borkovec, 1990). Participants then performed a random key-press task while either thinking
about a worry topic or a positive topic in counterbalanced order. After completing one task
participants completed mood and thought ratings. Participants then performed a filler task for
two minutes to prevent a carryover effect. After this they were asked to complete the other
thought condition and then complete the mood and thought ratings once again. The results
supported previous studies about anxiety that high worriers had less working memory capacity
available when engaging in worrisome tasks than in positive thought tasks. Also consistent with
prior research were the results that high worriers reported higher levels of anxiety and
depression. Through covariance analysis the results supported prior research that the reduction
in working memory capacity in high worriers was a result of the worry component of anxiety
rather than the effect of one’s mood state (Rapee, 1993). Overall, the results of the study by
Hayes, Hirsch, & Matthews (2008) support prior research that worry affects working memory
capacity.
Research was conducted by Derakshan & Eysenck (1998) on verbal reasoning
performance for high and low anxious subjects under high and low memory load conditions.
Participants in the study completed the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger et al., 1983) as
well as a scale which measures defensiveness called the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability
Scale (Corwne & Marlowe, 1964). The participants were then divided into low-anxious,
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repressor, high-anxious, and defensive high-anxious groups. Repressors are those who report
low scores of anxiety on scales but are physiologically and behaviorally anxious (Newton &
Contrada, 1992; Derakshan & Eysenck, 1997). The same loading paradigm as MacLeod and
Donnellan (1993) was used in the experiment. Participants were presented with a reasoning task
and either responded that the display was either true or false. In low memory load trials a set of
six zeroes was presented to participants before the display of the reasoning task. In the high
memory load trials there was a set of six random digits presented before the display of the
reasoning task. Participants were measured in both accuracy and response time. In all groups
the response on the verbal reasoning task was slower in the high memory load condition but this
effect was greater for high-anxious groups than both the low-anxious and repressor groups.
Response latencies on the memory test were also greater in the high memory load condition
rather than the low memory load condition. This was also qualified by an interaction with the
high-anxious and defensive-high anxious groups being more affected than the low-anxious and
repressor groups. The error rate on the verbal reasoning task and memory load task was
nonsignificant between the four groups. These results support the theory that high-anxious and
defensive-high anxious groups have more restricted working memory capacity than low-anxious
and repressor groups.
A study conducted by Eysenck, Payne, & Derakshan (2005) tested the affect that anxiety
would have on working memory during a cognitive task. Their study used the Corsi Blocks Test
(Corsi, 1972) which involves the central executive and the visuospatial sketchpad. Participants
were divided into high- and low-anxious groups based on their scores on the State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory (Spielberger et al., 1983). In the Corsi Blocks Test participants needed to tap blocks in
the same pattern as the experimenter did after a five second delay. There were also four different
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secondary tasks. The first was counting backwards by ones from a two-digit number out loud,
the second was a spatial tapping task in which participants had to tap out a “z” pattern, the third
was to repeat the letters A, B, C, and D out loud, and the fourth was a simple tapping task in
which participants had to tap one spot on a tapping pad continuously. The simple tapping task
served as the control condition. There was a significant difference in performance between the
high- and low-anxious groups in the Corsi Blocks Test when the secondary task involved
counting backwards. The two anxiety groups did not differ in the three other secondary task
conditions. This is believed to be a result of the fact that only the counting backwards task
required use of the central executive. This experiment provided further evidence that highanxiety groups had reduced working memory capacity leading to more errors in the main and
secondary tasks.
A study conducted by Wiener, Ehbauer, & Mallot (2009) tested the affects of working
memory capacity when it came to the use of planning heuristics in a spatial problem solving task.
The spatial task was based on the traveling salesman problem which consists of finding the
shortest closed loop connecting a starting location with multiple target locations. There were
three spatial planning heuristics that Wiener et al. discussed in the study. The first was the
nearest neighbor method in which participants visit the closest target that has not been visited
until all targets have been visited. The second was the cluster-strategy in which neighboring
targets are clustered together and that the closest and largest clusters are visited first. The third is
the region-based strategy in which participants try to minimize the number of region boundaries
they cross during navigation when trying to get to the nearest target. By using these strategies
participants reduce working memory demands when trying to navigate their routes.
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In the first experiment participants were given a list with symbols defining their starting
location and their target locations which they needed to maintain in working memory. These
corresponded to markers with the same symbols which were organized in a grid pattern
throughout the room. Results showed that with an increasing number of targets performance for
discovering the optimal path decreased and start time increased. This is believed to be due to the
increased strain on working memory due to the higher number of target locations that must be
kept in it.
The second had three different conditions; the no memory condition, the spatial working
memory condition, and the spatial working memory and long term memory condition. In the no
memory condition target location were marked in the environment. In the spatial working
memory condition participants were given a list of their target locations and needed to maintain
that list in their working memory. In the spatial working memory and long term memory
condition the symbols in the environment were covered and participants had a training phase
prior to the experiment where they learned the positions of the symbols. Then participants were
given a list of their target locations to find. There were also two types of navigation tasks,
region-strategy-adequate tasks and region-strategy-inadequate tasks. For the optimal path in
region-strategy-adequate tasks participants would need to visit all target locations in one region
before going to the next region. In region-strategy-inadequate tasks this region-based strategy
planning would not lead to participants finding the optimal path. Results indicated that there
were significant effects for the number of targets and condition. Planning performance
decreased with an increased number of target locations. Performance was best in the no memory
condition and worst in the spatial working memory and long term memory condition.
Participants were also more likely to find the optimal route in region-strategy-adequate tasks.
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However, the influence of region-based planning was weakest in the no memory condition
whereas it was stronger in the other two. This is most likely due to the fact that in the other two
conditions working memory was strained leading to the region-based planning heuristic.
Overall, performance decreased while use of region-based planning heuristics increased with an
increased working memory load. This study showed that increased working memory strains led
to an an increase in the use of heuristics.
Based upon all of this previous research, we tested the affect of trait anxiety on one’s
likelihood of committing the fundamental attribution error. Research has shown that people use
heuristics due to strains on their working memory capacity. Studies have also shown that anxiety
reduces working memory capacity. Therefore, it is logical to believe that anxieties affects on
working memory can lead to an increase in the use of cognitive heuristics. Due to all of the prior
research conducted on the negative effects of anxiety on working memory capacity we
hypothesized that those high in trait anxiety would be more likely to commit the fundamental
attribution error than those low in trait anxiety.
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Method
Participants
Data was collected over a period of five weeks in a psychology laboratory at Union
College. One hundred and thirty-nine Union College students participated in the study and were
recruited through a college-wide online research signup system. Three of the participant’s
responses were disregarded due to the fact that they did not fully complete the questionnaire.
Participants received either course credit or compensation for their participation in the study.
Sixty males and seventy-nine females participated. Their ages ranged from eighteen to twentytwo years of age.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions. In all of the conditions
participants read an essay about a potential course policy change at Union College that would
raise the mandatory course load from three to four classes per trimester. Participants were told
the essay was the opening statement written by a student for their debate class. In one condition,
participants read an essay that was pro-course policy change. They were also told that the author
had a choice in which position they could take in the essay. In the second condition, participants
read an essay that was anti-course policy change. They were also told that the author had a
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choice in which direction they could write the essay. In the third condition, participants read the
same pro-course policy change essay as the participants in the first condition did. However,
these participants were told that the author was assigned to write for that position. In the fourth
condition, participants read the same anti-course policy change essay as participants in the
second condition did. These participants were told that the author was assigned to write for that
position. The essays were almost identical with only some substitutions of single phrases or
qualifiers reversing the meaning of some sentences. Each participant signed a consent form
before beginning in which they were told the purpose of the study was to learn more about social
perception.
Participants were first asked to fill out a questionnaire which was actually the trait
anxiety subscale of the Spielberger state-trait anxiety inventory (Spielberger, Gorusch, Lushene,
Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). This inventory asked twenty questions about how participants feel
generally and asked them to rate it on a 4-pont scale with not at all being one and very much
being four. Participants were then asked to read the essay corresponding to whichever condition
they were randomly assigned as well as fill out a questionnaire about the essay. After reading
the essay, participants were then asked about the essay and the author and rated their responses
on a 7-point scale. For questions pertaining to the participants thoughts about the author and the
essay, one on the 7-point scale was extremely against and seven was extremely for. The most
important question was the one which asked the participants to what extent they believed the
position advocated in the essay expressed the writer’s true opinion. On this 7-point scale one
was not sure at all and seven was very sure. Then participants answered several questions about
their global impressions of the write and these too were answered on a 7-point scale. After this
participants were debriefed and dismissed.
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Results
There were thirty-five subject’s in the assigned for condition, forty-two in the assigned
against condition, thirty-four in the choice for condition, and twenty-eight in the choice against
condition. The participants were divided into high and low trait anxiety groups by splitting the
groups using the median score on the trait anxiety subscale of the Spielberger state-trait anxiety
scale. Sixty-eight participants were categorized as low trait anxiety as they scored a forty-seven
or below on the anxiety scale. Seventy-one participants were categorized as high trait anxiety.
The participants were asked what they believed was the typical undergraduate’s opinion
was on the policy as well as their own personal opinion on the policy. Results indicated that the
participants believed that the typical undergraduates opinion would be against a course policy
change (M = 2.05). The average participant’s own personal opinion was also against a policy
change (M = 2.48). Thus, the proposed policy did elicit a negative response from the student
populace as expected. An independent samples t-test was used to test whether there was a
difference in the means between the pro- and anti-policy change essays for the question
regarding the position of the essay. There was a significant difference between the two
conditions (t (137) = 12.59, p < .001). This was expected and shows that the essays did reflect
pro- and anti-policy change positions as was intended.
It was then tested whether there was an effect for choice, position, and anxiety on
whether the participant’s believed that the position of the essay was the true opinion of the
author. Scores on the question regarding the extent to which participant’s believe the position
advocated in the essay expressed the writer’s true opinion, the means of which are presented in
Figure 2, were submitted to a 2x2x2 univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA). It was tested
whether there was a difference between conditions and participant’s likelihood of believing the
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essay advocated the author’s true opinion. The only significant effect was for position (F (1,139)
= 7.00), p = .01). Those in the anti-policy change condition (M = 5.41) were more likely to
believe that the essay advocated the author’s true opinion than those in the pro-policy change
condition (M = 4.79). There was no effect for anxiety (F (1,139) = 1.75, p = .19) or choice (F (1,
139) = .89, p = .35). The means did reflect that those with high anxiety (M = 5.24) had higher
scores than those with low anxiety (M = 4.96) but this was not a significant difference. Those
with high anxiety in the choice anti-policy change condition had the highest mean score (M =
5.93) while those in the low anxiety no choice pro-policy change had the lowest mean score (M
= 4.36). Overall, the only significant effect on whether people believed the essay advocated the
author’s true opinion was the position of the essay.
The next question examined was whether there was an effect for choice, position, and
anxiety on what the participant believed the author’s personal opinion toward the course load
policy was. Scores on this question, the means of which are presented in Figure 4, were
submitted to a 2x2x2 ANOVA. The only significant main effect was the position of the essay (F
(1, 139) = 148.36, p < .001). Those in the pro-policy condition (M = 5.64) were more likely to
believe that the author’s personal opinion was pro-policy change while those in the anti-policy
condition (M = 1.93) were more likely to attribute an anti-policy change attitude to the author.
There was almost a significant 2-way interaction between choice and position (F (1, 139) = 3.39,
p = .068). Also, although there were no significant effects besides position there were interesting
mean scores. Those with low anxiety in the pro-policy change condition had higher mean scores
than those with high anxiety for both the choice (M = 5.95) and no choice (M = 5.79) conditions
than those with high anxiety (M = 5.75) and (M = 5.29) respectively. The same was not the case
for those in the no choice anti-policy condition as those with high anxiety (M = 2.73) had a
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higher score than those with low anxiety (M = 1.85). Overall, there was no real difference
between high anxiety (M = 3.75) and low anxiety (M = 3.79) attitude attribution scores. In the
pro-policy condition those with high anxiety had lower scores (M = 5.40) than those with low
anxiety (M = 5.88). The opposite was true in the anti condition where those with high anxiety
had higher scores (M = 2.14) than those with low anxiety (M = 1.71). The means show that
there is no effect besides position on what subjects thought the personal opinion on the policy
change was.
The third important question examined whether there was an effect for choice, position,
and anxiety on what the participants’ confidence in their judgment was regarding the question
about the author’s personal opinion. Scores on the question regarding how confident the
participant was in their judgment in terms of answering the question about the author’s personal
opinion on the policy, the means of which are presented in Figure 6, were submitted to a 2x2x2
ANOVA. There was no three way interaction between the three conditions (F (1, 139) = .21, p =
.65) nor were there any other main effects. The means for the low anxiety participant’s between
the choice and no choice conditions were different in both the pro- and anti policy change
conditions. In the choice pro-policy change condition low anxiety participant’s mean was lower
(M = 5.15) than those in the no choice condition (M = 6.07). The same applied to the anti-policy
change conditions where those in the choice condition (M = 5.14) had a lower mean than those in
the no choice condition (M = 5.85) for low anxiety participant’s. There was not as much of a
difference in the means for those who had high trait anxiety. Overall, there was no effect for any
of the conditions on participants’ confidence in their judgments of the author’s attitude.
Discussion
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Throughout life people sometimes unknowingly make errors in decision making and in
judgment about many different facets of life. It is all part of living in a world where not
everything is always as it seems. One such common error in judgment that people tend to make
is the fundamental attribution error. If one commits the fundamental attribution error they are
overestimating the internal factors and underestimating the external factors when explaining the
actions of other people. Prior research has shown that a variety of factors can influence the
likelihood that someone would commit FAE. People who are in a good mood are more likely to
commit the FAE than those who are in a bad mood (Forgas, 1998). Older people also seem to be
more likely to commit the FAE than younger people (Horhota & Blanchard-Fields 2006).
The current study examined if there was a correlation between someone’s trait anxiety
and their likelihood to commit the FAE. The hypothesis that those with high trait anxiety were
more likely to commit the FAE than those with low trait anxiety was not supported by the data.
The only significant effect was the position of the essay, as essay direction was the strongest
indicator of attitude attribution which is consistent with existing literature (Jones & Harris,
1967). Those who were in the anti-policy change condition were more likely to attribute an antipolicy attitude to the author than those in the pro-policy change condition. This is expected in
the choice condition but was also found in the no choice condition. This shows that even though
participants were explicitly told that the author was assigned to take the position they wrote
about, the participants still attributed that attitude to the author. Thus, they were committing the
FAE.
It is reasonable that those in the anti-policy change condition were more likely to attribute
that attitude to the author as the results did indicate that the student population was against the
proposed policy change. It was anticipated that the student population would be against the
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proposed policy change and the results corroborated that expectation. The anti-policy change
essay could also have been more convincing overall and thus people were more likely to believe
that that was the author’s true opinion.
It was anticipated that those with high anxiety would have the highest likelihood of
committing the FAE. Overall, those with high anxiety did have a higher mean score than those
with low anxiety but it was not a significant difference. The choice condition did have a higher
score which is logical as participants would believe that the essay reflected the authors true
opinion if the author chose to take that specific stance in the essay. However, the only
significant effect was position in regards to the attitude attributed to the author by the
participant’s.
There was a significant main effect in terms of the direction of the essay for the question
regarding what the participant’s believed the author’s opinion on the policy change was. This
was to be expected as that was answered using a bipolar scale. Participants with an anti-policy
change essay thought that the author was against the policy change while those who had a propolicy essay thought that the author was supportive of the policy change. This showed that the
position of the essay greatly influenced what the participant’s believed the author’s opinion on
the policy was.
There was no significant difference between the different conditions and the participant’s
confidence in their judgment. This was not expected as it was anticipated that those in the choice
condition would be more confident in their responses than those in the no choice condition. This
was because it would make sense that if it was known that the author chose the position then the
participant’s should be more confident in their attribution of the attitude to the author. The
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results were actually the opposite of what was expected as those in the no choice condition were
more confident in their judgment of the author’s opinion than those in the choice condition.
A possible limitation in the study was that the participants may not have correctly paid
attention to or remembered the sentence regarding the choice, or lack of choice, that the author
had in regards to the position taken in the essay. This may have been a cause for the fairly
similar means regarding participant’s beliefs of the author’s true opinion and their confidence in
such judgments between the choice and no choice conditions. A second possible limitation is
that trait anxiety did not have the desired effect of decreasing the working memory capacity of
participants. Thus, there may have been no difference in the working memory resources between
the high and low anxiety patients which could have lead to the lack of a significant difference
between the groups.
Future direction for research regarding trait anxieties influence on the likelihood one
commits the FAE could explore increasing the strain on the limited resources of working
memory. One explanation for the lack of a main effect for anxiety is that trait anxiety alone does
not occupy enough working memory resources in order to increase the chance that someone will
commit the FAE. Perhaps state anxiety, or both state and trait anxiety, would have more of an
effect on one’s likelihood of committing the FAE.
A second possible area that could be looked into would be to give the participant’s a
working memory task to increase the strain on their working memory. A task that would
increase the strain on the limited capacity of working memory, such as the loading paradigm
used by MacLeod and Donnellan (1993), could be used to see if that in conjunction with trait
anxiety would have an effect on the likelihood one would commit the FAE. Participants could
be divided into high and low memory load conditions and tested in the same manner as the
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current study. The combined strain of the working memory task and trait anxiety may have more
of an influence than just trait anxiety on its own.
In conclusion, the current study did not give any insight into a factor that will increase a
person’s likelihood of committing the FAE as expected. However, further investigations into the
effects of strained working memory on the chances that someone commits the FAE should be
explored as it may lead to new insights as to why people commit the FAE.
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Appendix A
Between-Subjects Factors
Value Label
choice

position
codeanxiety

N

1.00

choice

62

2.00

no choice

77

1.00

pro

69

2.00

anti

70

1.00

high

71

2.00

low

68

Figure 1: Subjects By Condition
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Descriptive Statistics
Dependent Variable:trueopinion
choice

position

codeanxiety

choice

pro

high

5.0000

1.70970

14

low

4.7000

1.83819

20

Total

4.8235

1.76619

34

high

5.9286

1.07161

14

low

5.2857

1.13873

14

Total

5.6071

1.13331

28

high

5.4643

1.47779

28

low

4.9412

1.59433

34

Total

5.1774

1.55262

62

high

5.0000

1.48324

21

low

4.3571

1.54955

14

Total

4.7429

1.52128

35

high

5.1818

1.05272

22

low

5.4000

1.78885

20

Total

5.2857

1.43622

42

high

5.0930

1.26893

43

low

4.9706

1.74920

34

Total

5.0390

1.49069

77

high

5.0000

1.55299

35

low

4.5588

1.70900

34

Total

4.7826

1.63482

69

anti

Total

no choice

pro

anti

Total

Total

pro

Mean

Std. Deviation

N
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anti

Total

high

5.4722

1.10805

36

low

5.3529

1.53509

34

Total

5.4143

1.32417

70

high

5.2394

1.35715

71

low

4.9559

1.66109

68

Total

5.1007

1.51464

139

Figure 2: Mean Scores for Question Pertaining to Author’s True Opinion on Policy

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable:trueopinion
Type III Sum of
Source

Squares

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

a

7

3.331

1.488

.177

3485.861

1

3485.861

1557.075

.000

choice

1.987

1

1.987

.887

.348

position

15.669

1

15.669

6.999

.009

3.906

1

3.906

1.745

.189

choice * position

.175

1

.175

.078

.780

choice * codeanxiety

.561

1

.561

.251

.618

position * codeanxiety

.561

1

.561

.251

.618

3.027

1

3.027

1.352

.247

Error

293.273

131

2.239

Total

3933.000

139

316.590

138

Corrected Model
Intercept

codeanxiety

choice * position *

23.317

codeanxiety

Corrected Total

a. R Squared = .074 (Adjusted R Squared = .024)

Figure 3: Interactions Between Different Factors for Question Pertaining to Author’s True
Opinion on Policy
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Descriptive Statistics
Dependent Variable:authorsopinion
choice

position

codeanxiety

choice

pro

high

5.5714

2.06488

14

low

5.9500

1.60509

20

Total

5.7941

1.78851

34

high

1.2143

.42582

14

low

1.5000

1.09193

14

Total

1.3571

.82616

28

high

3.3929

2.65747

28

low

4.1176

2.62580

34

Total

3.7903

2.64350

62

high

5.2857

2.32686

21

low

5.7857

2.00686

14

Total

5.4857

2.18782

35

high

2.7273

2.25054

22

low

1.8500

1.49649

20

Total

2.3095

1.95670

42

high

3.9767

2.60483

43

low

3.4706

2.59645

34

Total

3.7532

2.59633

77

high

5.4000

2.19893

35

low

5.8824

1.75404

34

Total

5.6377

1.99242

69

high

2.1389

1.91465

36

anti

Total

no choice

pro

anti

Total

Total

pro

anti

Mean

Std. Deviation

N
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Total

low

1.7059

1.33778

34

Total

1.9286

1.66221

70

high

3.7465

2.62253

71

low

3.7941

2.61202

68

Total

3.7698

2.60800

139

Figure 4: Mean Scores for Question Pertaining to Author’s Personal Opinion

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable:authorsopinion
Type III Sum of
Source

Squares

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

Corrected Model

506.841

a

7

72.406

21.967

.000

Intercept

1865.290

1

1865.290

565.904

.000

4.170

1

4.170

1.265

.263

489.005

1

489.005

148.358

.000

.172

1

.172

.052

.820

11.174

1

11.174

3.390

.068

choice * codeanxiety

2.266

1

2.266

.687

.409

position * codeanxiety

4.514

1

4.514

1.370

.244

choice * position *

3.446

1

3.446

1.045

.308

Error

431.792

131

3.296

Total

2914.000

139

938.633

138

choice
position
codeanxiety
choice * position

codeanxiety

Corrected Total
a.

R Squared = .540 (Adjusted R Squared = .515)

Figure 5: Interactions Between Different Factors for Question Pertaining to Author’s
Personal Opinion on Policy
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Descriptive Statistics
Dependent Variable:confidence
choice

position

codeanxiety

choice

pro

high

5.5714

2.17377

14

low

5.1500

1.56525

20

Total

5.3235

1.82110

34

high

5.2857

1.77281

14

low

5.1429

2.14322

14

Total

5.2143

1.93136

28

high

5.4286

1.95180

28

low

5.1471

1.79448

34

Total

5.2742

1.85693

62

high

5.5714

1.56753

21

low

6.0714

.91687

14

Total

5.7714

1.35225

35

high

5.5909

1.43623

22

low

5.8500

1.56525

20

Total

5.7143

1.48629

42

high

5.5814

1.48376

43

low

5.9412

1.32439

34

Total

5.7403

1.41795

77

high

5.5714

1.80336

35

anti

Total

no choice

pro

anti

Total

Total

pro

Mean

Std. Deviation

N
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anti

Total

low

5.5294

1.39773

34

Total

5.5507

1.60455

69

high

5.4722

1.55813

36

low

5.5588

1.82891

34

Total

5.5143

1.68319

70

high

5.5211

1.67212

71

low

5.5441

1.61554

68

Total

5.5324

1.63876

139

Figure 6: Mean Scores for Question Pertaining to Participants Confidence in Judgment

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable:confidence
Type III Sum of
Source

Squares

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

a

7

1.731

.632

.728

4086.624

1

4086.624

1493.342

.000

choice

7.810

1

7.810

2.854

.094

position

.511

1

.511

.187

.666

codeanxiety

.079

1

.079

.029

.865

choice * position

.017

1

.017

.006

.937

choice * codeanxiety

3.658

1

3.658

1.337

.250

position * codeanxiety

.003

1

.003

.001

.974

choice * position *

.564

1

.564

.206

.651

Error

358.490

131

2.737

Total

4625.000

139

370.604

138

Corrected Model
Intercept

12.115

codeanxiety

Corrected Total

a. R Squared = .033 (Adjusted R Squared = -.019)

Figure 7: Interactions Between Different Factors for Question Pertaining to Participants
Confidence in Judgment

